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Safety Investigation Report

Ref. AAIU-2022-08-06-01
Issue date: 06 August 2025
Status: Final

Scope: Limited

As per ICAO Annex 13 and EU regulation EU 996/2010, decisions regarding whether to conduct a civil aviation safety investigation, and the extent of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit expected to be drawn from such an investigation.
For this occurrence, a limited-scope, fact-gathering investigation and analysis was conducted in order to produce a short summary report. The investigation mainly focussed on the actions and conditions directly relating to the occurrence and might not cover all aspects of the aircraft operation and/or possible underlying safety factors due to the expected safety benefit of it and/or the extent of evidence/resources available.

SYNOPSYS

Occurrence class	Accident
Occurrence category	Loss of control - inflight (LOC-I)
Date and time[1]	Saturday 06 August 2022 13:45 UTC
Location	Runway 11 – Aerodrome of Tournai/Maubray (EBTY) 50°31'55.39"N 3°29'37.91"E
Aircraft	Schleicher K6Cr
Aircraft category	Fixed wing - Sailplane - Non-powered
Location of departure	Aerodrome of Tournai/Maubray (EBTY)
Planned destination	Idem
Type of operation	Non-commercial - Local
Phase of flight	Takeoff
Injuries	1 fatal
Aircraft damage	Destroyed

What happened

A sailplane entered a clockwise spin during a winch launch.

[1] All time data in this report are indicated in UTC, unless otherwise specified

1. THE OCCURRENCE

Runway 11 of EBTY was in use for the sailplane activity. A winch was used for the take-off.
Before the sailplane took off, 17 other sailplanes did take-off from the runway, 11 of which occurred during the morning.

The sailplane was stored in the hangar and it was its first flight of the day. The pilot owner accompanied the pilot for the pre-flight checks.

The pilot climbed on board, made the preparation for the flight; the cable was attached to the sailplane and the pilot radioed the winchman to signal he was ready for the take-off.

The winchman started the launch and the sailplane accelerated along runway 11.

The sailplane immediately climbed with a rather high pitch attitude. .

During the climb, the aircraft was seen drifting slightly to the left with left wing down, followed by an apparent correction by the pilot. Immediately thereafter, the right wing went down and the sailplane entered in an incipient spin from an height of about 100 meters (+-300 ft) above ground level (= 7 times the wing span, based on the video recordings). The sailplane spun one and half rotations clockwise before hitting the ground.

Figure 1 : reconstructed flight path, glider symbol not on scale. The white arrows indicate the variation in wind direction, derived from METARS in the vicinity.

The aircraft was destroyed at impact and the pilot was fatally injured

2. CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Personnel information

Table 1 : General pilot data

Nationality	Belgian	Age	48
License	Pilot Licence SPL, first issued on 28 September 2021		
Ratings	Aerotow, Winch		
Medical	LAPL valid until 14 September 2023		

Flying experience pilot

The pilot accumulated a total of 179 flights and 58 flight hours 16' 23 flight hours 46', of which 142 winch take-offs,36 aerotows and 1 TMG since the start of his training in 2016 .
19 flights were performed solo.

Last 90 days he performed 6 flights, of which 5 with a winch start.
Last flight before this one was on 23 July; 6 minutes with an ASK-21 with a winch start.
Last flight with an instructor was on 15 May, with a winch start and a cable failure exercise.

Details per model:

ASK-13: 146 flights
ASK-21: 17 flights
Ka-8: 7 flights
SF25C: 1 flight
DG1000: 4 flight
Twin Astir II: 3 flights
Ka6: 1 (solo) flight with aerotow start in September 2021

It was the pilot's first winch launch with a Ka6. He did have a few winch launches on the Ka-8, which exhibits fairly similar flight characteristics, although there are some differences in instrument layout, and trim system.

2.2 Aircraft information

The Schleicher Ka 6 Rhönsegler is a single-seat sailplane designed by Rudolf Kaiser built by Alexander Schleicher GmbH and is constructed of spruce and plywood with fabric covering. The design initially featured a conventional tailplane and elevator which was later replaced by an all-moving tailplane in the -Pe and Ka 6E variants. The Ka 6CR had the main skid removed and a relocated mainwheel.

The Type Certificate reference for this aircraft is N° 205 Revision 14 of 15/11/96.



Figure 2 : 3-view of the aircraft

Table 2 : General aircraft data

General	
Manufacturer	Alexander Schleicher GmbH
Model:	Ka 6 CR (nick name Rhönsegler)
History	
Year of built:	1963
Registration:	Registered by the Belgian Civil Aviation Authority (BCAA)
Airworthiness	Last Airworthiness Review Certificate issued by the BCAA at 1 May 2022 and valid until 24 May 2023
Serial:	6132
Total hours	2727 FH

Performance

- Maximum glide ratio: 32:1 at 80 km/h
- Rate of sink: 0.65 m/s
- Stall speed (weight of 260 kg) : 58 km/h

The airspeed indicator installed in the aircraft displayed airspeeds in km/h.

Winch hook

For the winch launch, a hook installed near the aircraft's centre of gravity (GG) is used. This hook is of the TOST Europa G72 type and is for this aircraft slightly off-centre to the left, which always results in a slight yaw to the right.

The automatic release of the CG-hook is determined by the angle between the winch cable and the longitudinal axis of the glider. This automatic release typically will happen when the angle approaches 83° +-7°.

Elevator trim

The Ka6 is standardly equipped with a 'spring trimmer'; the trim lever is connected to a spring that exerts a force on the control stick. When you adjust the trim, the spring force changes.

However, this aircraft was fitted with the alternative option of a 'Flettner' tab. This is a tab at the trailing edge of the elevator that functions both as an anti-servo and a trim tab. It automatically moves in the same direction as the elevator surface, making the movement of the control surface more difficult and requiring more force from the pilot to operate the controls. The anti-servo tab serves to artificially increase stability and also gives the controls a heavier feel to the pilot.

However, the tab's setting can be adjusted via a trim lever in the cockpit to change the neutral or resting position of the elevator. As the desired position of the elevator changes—mainly depending on the phase of flight and the desired airspeed—an adjustable trim tab allows the pilot to reduce the manual force needed to maintain that position.

Flight manual

Some relevant extracts:



Weak Links in the Tow Cable:

Winch-launch	max.	635 kp	1400 lbs
	min.	525 kp	1160 lbs
Airplane-tow	max.	450 kp	990 lbs
	min.	300 kp	660 lbs

Operating Instructions:

Winch-launching:

Maximum permissible winch-launch airspeed is 100 km/h, 62 mph, 54 kts.

Any slight tendency for the nose to pitch up can be controlled through appropriate stick operation.

Figure 3 : information on winch launching



Stalling and Spinning Behaviour

In stalled flight and stick full back the aircraft can still be controlled by the rudder. Applying much rudder will cause spinning. Recovery is initiated by taking back all controle in normal position. The C.g.-postition has a considerable influence on the spinning characteristics.
C.g. in forward position, the glider will perform a spiral dive shortly after initiating a spin and very rapidly build up high speed and g-loads. In this case the airbrakes should be extended before recovery. Adverse spinning characteristics at rearward positions of the certificated c.g. range have not been observed so far.

Figure 4 : Stalling and spinning behaviour explained in the flight manual

Weight and balance

The empty mass recorded in the latest weight report was 208 kg. With a maximum take-off mass of 300 kg, the pilot's maximum allowable weight is 92 kg. The pilot's exact weight was not obtained but is estimated to be between 75 and 85 kg.

2.3 Winch information

The winch used was a KLu T2 model, manufactured in 1965. It has an available power of approximately 300 hp. The transmission is an automatic Hydramatic type, offering three forward speeds. Power is controlled with a single throttle.

2.4 Meteorological information

That day, the meteo was dominated by an Azores High expanding over Western Europe, ensuring dry weather.

Weather reports from aerodromes in the vicinity:

Source:	**METAR military aerodrome of Chièvres (EBCV)**	
Distance from accident site:	12 nm northeast of EBTY	
Time:	13:25 UTC	13:55 UTC
Average wind directions and speed:	30° - 09 kt	50° - 7 kt
Variable wind directions:	Not indicated	Not indicated
Visibility and sky condition:	Visibility 10 km or more Few clouds at 6600 ft	Visibility 10 km or more Scattered clouds at 6200 ft, broken at 6900 ft
Temperature	23°C	22°C
Dew point	05°C	06°C
Altimeter (QNH)	1027 hPa	1027 hPa
Trend forecast	No significant change	No significant change

Source:	**METAR airport of Lille-Lesquin (LFQQ)**	
Distance from accident site:	15 nm west of EBTY	
Time:	13:30 UTC	14:00 UTC
Average wind directions and speed:	30° - 10 kt	10° - 8 kt
Variable wind directions:	350 – 070°	310° - 100°
Visibility and sky condition:	CAVOK[2]	CAVOK
Temperature	22°C	22°C
Dew point	08°C	07°C
Altimeter (QNH)	1027 hPa	1027 hPa
Trend forecast	No significant change	No significant change

[2] CAVOK: Ceiling and visibility OK: Visibility 10 km or greater, no thunderclouds and no cloud below (5000 ft)

Source:	Kortrijk Airport (EBKT)(20 nm north of EBTY)	
Distance from accident site:	20 nm north of EBTY	
Time:	13:20 UTC	13:39 UTC
Average wind directions and speed:	50° - 7 kt	Variable 3 kt
Variable wind directions:	310 – 090° 2 – 13 kt	Variable 2- 10 kt
Visibility and sky condition:	CAVOK	CAVOK
Temperature	22°C	23°C
Dew point	/	/
Altimeter (QNH)	1028.2 hPa	1027.9 hPa
Trend forecast	/	/

Summarized there was a gentle breeze with variable direction, but the average direction was 30-50° (NE)

A windsock was available on site, but not visible on the smartphone video.

2.5 Aerodrome information

Maubray airfield (EBTY) is a private airfield located in the vicinity of the town of Tournai, west of Belgium near the French border. It features a bi-directional grass runway 11/29 of 640 m long and 18 m wide.
There's a mixed activity of airplanes and gliders.
Aerodrome elevation is 153 ft.



Figure 5 : non-official aerodrome chart, indicating the runway and traffic pattern as published on the website EBTY

2.6 Recorded data

The sailplane was not equipped with a flight recorder, nor was it required. The sailplane was equipped with a FLARM, that could record some flight data. Attempts were made to download data, but it was unsuccessful due to the short duration of the flight.

The flight was filmed via a smartphone by a witness, standing at the sailplane start position.

2.7 Wreckage and impact information

The aircraft dived in a steep nose-down attitude and impacted ground with righthand wing and nose first. It immediately broke up.

The wreckage was reconstructed and inspected on 11 August.

After wreckage rebuilding, the most significant parts and damages observed on the glider were the following :

2.7.1 Fuselage

Broken on four main damaged sections :

- The mid-section, aft of the cockpit, with the wing flight controls junction box still entire but sheared on the lower surface and the control input rods still in place but weakened by impact ;
- The cockpit section completely disintegrated with only the lower wheel assy & floor, the metallic controls, cables and devices (altimeter instrument, radio, altimetric system) still remaining present ;
- Some remaining parts of the nose section completely disintegrated with the towing cable locking system still continuous from the nose locking device to the yellow control handle in the cockpit ;
- The canopy broken into several parts but with the cockpit red locking handle in the locked position.

2.7.2 Wings

Both wings were severely damaged on their structure and surfaces :

- The right wing was broken on 3 main separated sections. The inner section up to the speed brake (included), the external mid-section broken at the main beam level and the wing tip. The aileron rod was also separated at the same area than the main beam.

- The left wing surface was most visibly damaged on the external mid-section, with a wing and wing tip surface split in 2 parts along the main beam. The wing main beam was still in one piece, continuous from the wing root until the wing tip and with the flight controls not visually discontinued or showing any rupture of their control rods.

2.7.3 Tail section

The section was intact, excepted for damages on the lower rudder surfaces (most probably due to secondary impact with ground on this area). A 20 cm cut was present on the right elevator surface at the level of the trim tab control rod.

Figure 6 : damages on the lower rudder surface and cut on the right hand elevator inner section

2.7.4 Flight controls check

The following flight controls have been checked for continuity :

- The elevator trim control was continuous and operative all along the fuselage to the movable tab surface (free full up and down deflection).
- The rudder cables were continuous and operative from the cockpit pedals to the control surface (free full left and right deflection).
- The elevator control was continuous and operative from the cockpit to the rod rupture at the mid-section separation of the fuselage. Manual inputs on the broken rod of the tail section provided free full up and down deflection of the movable surface.

- The speed brakes handle and ailerons stick controls were continuous and operative from the cockpit to their control dedicated rods in the fuselage to wing junction box (aft of the cockpit - wings removed).
- The continuity check has been performed on both wing connection for aileron and speed brakes operation:

  On the left wing, a free full up and down deflection was observed for the aileron, the speed brake raised up partially from the extrados surface due to damages to the wing.

  On the right wing, the control rod was operative from the wing root connection to the mid-wing broken rod (due to ground impact). Manual input on the aileron rod from the external wing section provided a free full up and down deflection of the aileron surface. Input on the speed brake connection at the wing root provide a full extension of the surface from the inner wing.

2.7.5 Other controls

The canopy handle was locked - the towing cable release handle continuous from the cockpit to the nose section located device.

2.7.6 Weak link

The weak link used was blue, which is the appropriate type for the Ka 6 (breaking load 600 +- 60 daN or 1350 lbs).

2.8 Survival aspects

The pilot utilized the installed 4-point upper restraint, but it failed at the anchor points. Given the angle and speed of impact, the accident was deemed notsurvivable.

2.9 Organizational information

2.9.1 Operator

The flight was conducted outside of training conditions by a licensed pilot. The aircraft was not owned by a club but by a private individual (not the pilot himself). Therefore, as pilot in command (PIC), he was fully responsible for flight safety, risk analyses, and checklists.

However, glider operations are typically carried out in groups/clubs due to the specificity and launch methods. In this case, it was done under the umbrella of the Royal Tournai Air Club

(RTAC). The club, together with the seven other clubs from the French-speaking part of Belgium, is part of the *Fédération des Clubs Francophones de Vol à Voile* (FCFVV). This federation is responsible for the Declared Training Organisation (DTO) and manages its operations. However, the actual training is provided at five so-called "antennas," one of which is RTAC. The involved pilot completed his training nearly a year earlier within this antenna. The checklists and procedures used by all members in the club correspond to those taught at the DTO.

The training on winch launch for the glider pilots is based upon the "Memento de l'instructeur de pilote de planeur" (issued by the French Federation FFVP, edition 2/2020). A checklist was developed to cover both launching techniques (aerotow and winch launch), highlighting what is specific for which technique.

2.9.2 Winch operations

The winching occurs in accordance with a written procedure which seem to be have followed according to the available footage.
The power to be applied is based on the type of glider, its mass, and the wind.
At the signal, the selected cable is tightened by engaging the drum and clutch, with reduced throttle. When the glider pilot announces "TENDU!" (French for "tight"), throttle is applied while the winch operator announces "Winch launch starting at Maubray, radio silence."
The throttle setting is adjusted, based on the glider being winched and the wind conditions.
The cable's flex and the pilot's radio indications are used to assist with this.

If the speed is not suitable, the pilot has to announce via the radio: "Lentement" (Slow down) or "Plus vite" (Speed up). The winch operator will slow down or speed up immediately but smoothly.

Reportedly, the RTAC also makes use of international agreed signals if radio communication fails. However no written procedure was shown for this. If the launch is too slow, the nose has to be lowered. The winch operator will than increase the throttle. As the speed increases, the pilot should gradually pull the control stick towards him.
If the launch is too fast, the winch operator can be signalled to slow down by making the glider yaw left-right in a clear signal using the rudder pedals.

2.10 Information on winch launch

A winch launch typically consists of several distinct stages:

- ground roll and lift
- transition to climb
- climb
- transition to level flight and cable release
- after cable release



Figure 7 : the stages of a typical winch launch: 1. ground roll and lift 2. transition to climb 3. climb 4. transition to level flight and cable release 5. after cable release. Sketch retaken from the Dutch website from KNVVL

Ground roll

During the initial acceleration there are several things to do, simultaneously:

- Lift tail or nose (depending on type of glider) to balance on the mainwheel.
- Keep the wings level. Initially this may need large deflections of the ailerons (moving the control stick left or right).
- Normally, no rudder input is needed. But in case of crosswinds the weathercock (or weathervane) effect has to be taken into account. If the wind is blowing sideways towards the fin, it will try to turn the glider's nose. The glider can be prevented from turning sideways by using some opposing rudder. If, for example, the wind is coming from the right, left rudder needs to be applied when rolling on the ground.

Transition to climb

Once the airspeed is sufficient, the climb angle has to be gradually increased from 10° to a typical pitch of 35°- 45°.
Normally, it should take about 5 seconds to get to the climb attitude.
Some gliders have the tendency to automatically 'over-rotate' into a steep climb just after lift-off, because of the hook being below the centre of gravity and in cases where the winch driver accelerates the cable too quickly. If this happens, the stick has to be pushed forward immediately. Over-rotating can be prevented by keeping some slight forward pressure on the stick, helped by setting the trim slightly forward of neutral before the launch.

Rotating rapidly is to be avoided, the dangers of climbing too steep at low altitudes are serious. If the critical angle of attack is exceeded, the airflow will separate from the wing, the lift will decrease and the drag will increase and one could enter a stall (Figure 8).



Figure 8: too high rotation giving a steep climb angle and a high angle of attack. Note that the flight path (magenta curve) itself will be less steep due to the higher drag

That is why a slow increase in climb angle with adequate speed and continued acceleration during the transition phase has to be maintained (see Figure 9).



Figure 9: gradually increase of pitch angle to keep the angle of attack low

Extract from the “Safe Winch Launching” booklet issued by the British Gliding Association (BGA):

“*Maintain the glider in a shallow climb (10 to 15 degrees) until you achieve the predetermined minimum safe airspeed on the ASI (typically 1.5 times the stalling speed) and you feel continued acceleration.*

This may require a substantial push on the stick, especially if you are a light pilot, flying with a C of G towards the rear, and/or the acceleration is rapid, or you are flying a glider with the hook well below the C of G (eg a K8).

Having achieved the minimum safe speed, typically 50% above the stalling speed, allow the glider to rotate into the full climb at a controlled pace. Continue to monitor the airspeed. If it starts decreasing, reduce the rate of rotation (and even reduce the already achieved climbing angle, ed.)

Be aware that with competent winch driving many gliders will take off and rotate into the climb in a safe manner of their own accord. You may think you are controlling the winch launch profile but this may not be the case. This is one reason that many simulated launch failures are essential before solo."

2.11 Managing flying risk: currency barometer

Already in the early nineties, the German Luftfahrt Bundesamt (LBA) (the German's civil aviation authority) initiated a study into the relationship between glider pilot proficiency and accident probability, taking into account the gliding accidents in Germany during a period of 15 years. The message was clear: the more you've flown in the last 90 days, the less likely it is that you will have an accident. Pilot currency in the published data from the study was defined as number of launches (not hours) in the last 3 months.



Figure 10 : Percentage of accidents compared to launches in the past 90 days.

The explanation is not risk exposure (if you fly more, you are more exposed to the flying risk) but risk awareness and management. It's about risk competency – having the ready-to-deploy skills and abilities to recognize risk, absorb it, adapt to it, handle it. Risk competency comes chiefly from pilot currency.
To handle this, the LBA designed a 'Sicher Segelfliegen Trainingsbarometer', which was later taken over by the BGA (British Gliding Association) as the 'Pilot currency barometer' (Figure 11).



Figure 11 : Pilot currency barometer highlighting the risk areas

3. ANALYSIS

3.1 The launch

Figure 12 : sequences of the launch recorded via smartphone camera

From the video footage, we see that the right wing is held while the cable is tensioned. Once the power of the winch is brought forward, we see the aircraft accelerate normally and straight. We see no signs of the possible yaw to the right due to the left off-centre CG-hook. Just past the runway numbers, we then see the lift-off, where a fairly steep climb angle is immediately adopted. This is also something that the witnesses on site notice and mention in the video

recording. It certainly did not take 5 seconds to transition from level flight to a full climb attitude.
This steep angle is maintained, and we subsequently see the aircraft start to drift to the left with his lefthand wing low, while the prevailing left crosswind would rather cause a drift to the right. This is therefore something that was controlled by the pilot. This crosswind correction can be initiated by the pilot himself, or on demand by the winch driver if he thinks the cable will otherwise fall down too far downwind after release. However, the latter confirmed that this was not the case for this launch.

After approximately 10 seconds, a roll to the right is observed. The right bank angle increases rapidly, and the aircraft almost immediately enters a clockwise spin. This suggests a sudden and forceful movement of the control stick to the right, possibly intended to correct a perceived overcompensation to the left due to the crosswind effect. Given the already steep climb angle and resulting high angle of attack (AoA), the rapid downward movement of the right wing may have pushed the AoA beyond its critical threshold. If this was accompanied by strong right rudder input, it could have further slowed the right wing and increased its AoA beyond what was induced by the ailerons alone.

Almost simultaneously, we see a release of the cable with the parachute drifting downwards. This was an action performed by the pilot because the aircraft was not at a pitch angle to activate the automatic release at that moment.

The winch operator declared that for this start he gradually increased throttle to the mid-position. The pilot did not communicate anything over the radio or by using signals (see chapter 2.9.2 of this report).

Nothing technical was found in the aircraft controls. As soon as the aircraft took off, it means it had lift and the control organs were aerodynamically functional to maintain control, being a certified aircraft. In other words, it should always be possible to bring the nose forward to reduce the angle of attack of the aircraft and increase the speed to a safer value before returning to a typical climb position. The airspeed range to be maintained is between the minimum safe airspeed (advised as 1.5 times the 1G stall speed), and the maximum winch speed. This means for this aircraft between 87 and 100 km/h, which is a rather small window.

3.2 The spin

After the stall of the right wing, the aircraft goes into a clockwise spin with the nose steeply down. After one and a half turns, the aircraft hits the ground from a height of about 100 meters, with the nose and right wing first. Such a height is almost too low to recover from the spin.



Figure 13 : An illustrated spin, retaken from the Dutch KNVV, which up to the red dotted line, matches very well with what can be seen on the smartphone video recordings.

3.3 Pilot currency

<u>'Barometer'</u>

If we place the pilot's experience over the past 12 months (12.5 flight hours and 25 launches) into the currency barometer, we end up in the yellow section (See Figure 14). Some of the associated risks listed were also applicable in this case:

- Crosswind take-off (listed on the left under "difficult weather conditions")
- New type of glider and launch; this was only his second flight with the Ka6 and the first winch launch with this type.



Figure 14 : pilot currency

Experience with elevator trim system

The pilot had flown extensively on the ASK-21, which uses a spring trim. Trimming via a trim tab does not provide tactile feedback at low speeds, unlike a spring trim, where the pilot can even feel whether the aircraft is nose- or tail-heavy while stationary. The trim tab becomes more effective as speed increases, whereas the spring trim tends to become less effective.

An erroneous nose-up trim not detected during the preflight may possibly have contributed to the adoption of the immediately steep climb angle. However, due to the damage, the trim setting could no longer be confirmed. Nevertheless, any non-ideal trim setting should at all times have been controllable and overridable by the pilot.

4. FINDINGS

4.1 Findings as to causal and contributing factors

- The aircraft almost immediately adopted an excessively steep angle of climb.
- The prevailing left crosswind may have prompted the pilot to correct for the expected drift.
- Having overcorrected to the left, the critical angle of attack of the right wing was exceeded while attempting to return to the right, resulting in a stall of that wing, followed immediately by a clockwise spin.
- Once the aircraft was in a fully developed spin, it was almost impossible to recover due to the low altitude.
- No technical issues were found in the flight controls that could have contributed to the accident.

4.2 Findings as to risks

- Low currency as glider pilot.
- Take-off elevator trim setting that might have been wrong and not detected during pre-flight.

4.3 Other findings

- The weight and balance did not play a role.
- The correct weak link was used.

5. SAFETY ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

*A **safety issue** is a safety factor that (a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a characteristic of an organization or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operational environment at a specific point in time.*

*A **safety action:** the steps taken or proposed to be taken by an organization or agency on its own initiative in response to a safety issue.*

*A **safety recommendation** is a proposal by the safety investigation authority in response to a safety issue and based on information derived from an investigation and/or study. It's aimed to improve the safety of an organisation and/or system and therefor always addressed to an organisation and/or agency, never to a specific individual. The sole purpose of a safety recommendation is the prevention of accidents or incidents and the reduction of the consequences of such occurrences. It, in no case has the purpose of creating a presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. Neither does it reflect the level of contribution to a specific accident or incident.*

*A **safety lesson learned** is the knowledge and insight gained through an individual's experience, intended to be applied to prevent similar events from occurring in the future.*

*A **safety message:** An awareness which brings to attention the existence of a safety factor and the lessons learned. AAIU can distribute a safety message to a community (of pilots, instructors, examiners, ATC officers), an organization or an industry sector for it to consider a safety factor and take action where it believes it appropriate. There is no requirement for a formal response to a safety message.*

5.1 Safety actions

Following the accident, numerous actions were taken by the aeroclub including:

- consultations with the board of the DTO of the FCFVV;
- new check flights for all pilots conducted by experienced instructors;
- appointment of a safety officer, who has distributed a series of safety documents, including the 'currency barometer'. This is regularly explained during daily briefings and through new publications.

The experience (both total and recent) of the pilots is now systematically monitored within the club. Annual check flights are also conducted more thoroughly.

The AAIU supports these initiatives taken and has no further safety recommendations.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

General	
What?	Safety investigation reports are a technical document that reflects the views of the investigation team on the circumstances that led to the accident or serious incident and is conducted in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Regulation (EU) No 996/2010.
Objective	**The sole objective of safety investigations is the determination of the causes, and to define safety recommendations in order to prevent future accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability.** In particular, Article 17-3 of Regulation (EU) 996/2010 stipulates that the safety recommendations made in this report do not constitute any suspicion of guilt or responsibility.
Investigation authority	The Air Accident Investigation Unit of Belgium (AAIU for the rest of this publication). It is the Belgian permanent national civil aviation safety investigation authority as defined in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 and established in accordance with the Royal Decree of 26 December 2022. This unit is part of the Federal Public Service Mobility and Transport and is functionally independent from the Belgian Civil Aviation Authority and other interested parties.
This investigation	
Investigation initiation	AAIU was notified of the occurrence by both the aerodrome operator and by Skeyes ACC. One investigator deployed and arrived at scene at 16:00 UTC.
Scope	Limited As per Annex 13 and EU regulation EU 996/2010, each safety investigation shall be concluded with a report in a form appropriate to the type and seriousness of the accident and serious incident. For this occurrence, a limited-scope, fact-gathering investigation and analysis was conducted in order to produce a short summary report. The investigation mainly focussed on the actions and conditions directly relating to the occurrence and might not cover all aspects of the aircraft operation and/or possible underlying safety factors due to the expected safety benefit of it and/or the extent of evidence/resources available.
Other parties involved	None
	AAIU would like to thank the mentioned parties above and all other entities and individuals that have contributed to this safety investigation.